We study the potential conflict between cost minimization and investment in prevention for a risky venture. A natural monopoly is regulated i) for economic purposes; ii) because it can cause losses of substantial size to third parties (the environment or people). The regulator observes the production cost without being able to distinguish the initial type (an adverse selection parameter) from the effort (a moral hazard variable). In addition, the investment in prevention is non observable (another moral hazard variable) and the monopoly is protected by limited liability. We fully characterize the optimal regulation in this context of asymmetric information plus limited liability. We show that incentives to reduce cost and to invest in safety are always compatible. But, in some cases, higher rents have to be given up by the regulator.
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Introduction
We study the design of a suitable public policy for managing industrial and environmental accidents such as oil spills, nuclear accidents, fires, explosions or air/soil/water contamination. The major wave of health, safety and environmental regulation that began in the 1970s, with the pioneering role of the United States, led to the enactment of new regulatory agencies with broad responsibilities for risk and environmental policy (see Viscusi, 2007 ) . However, there are many drawbacks for any efficient public intervention. These include asymmetric information between public authorities and potential polluters regarding relevant parameters such as the scale of potential harm, the probability of an accident, the cost of prevention, the firm's assets level. In the case of regulated sectors, private information on firms' efficiency -which interferes with any economic regulation -can add to the private information on environmental parameters. Moreover, firms are protected by limited liability. Different sources of inefficiency may thus be compounded. The objective of this paper is to better understand the optimal public policy toward a firm in such contexts. In particular, firms may face an internal conflict between cost minimization and prevention. How should public authorities tackle such a conflict? We provide a normative analysis to answer this question. We describe the optimal regulation of a risky venture that benefits from private information both on efficiency and safety care that in addition is protected by limited liability.
Consider a natural monopoly that undertakes some socially valuable activity but can potentially cause an accident affecting third parties, the environment or people's health or private property. This monopoly can take actions to reduce the expected losses: it can invest to reduce the probability of accidents, such investment in prevention being costly. This monopoly is already regulated for economic purposes.
1 The regulation is introduced under asymmetric information regarding some relevant variables. More specifically, we assume that the regulator observes the production cost of the monopoly, but cannot distinguish the monop oly's typ e (an adverse selection parameter) from the monopoly's effort toward cost reduction (a moral hazard variable). As already said, the monopoly can also invest in prevention. 2 It is assumed that both types of investment or effort interact through a disutility function: the two levels of effort are not independent. The externality between the natural monopoly and third parties calls for public intervention. We assume that both the economic and the environmental regulations are designed by the same Agency.
3 Hence, the Agency elaborates a regulatory contract with one eye on cost reduction and another on prevention. The Agency implements an incentive regulation that induces safety care and revelation about its type by the monopoly.
